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Technical

45 articles

A quiet new residential street at dusk between brick houses, with site barriers in the foreground and no traffic

End to End Driving Safety: What a Checker Cannot Check

The checker was right, the corridor was clear, and the car still reached the child at 23 km/h. Why a single learned network resists the usual ISO 26262 argument, what a doer and checker pair really buys, and why a checker's guarantee is a different thing from the system's safety. New article, with a fictional car passing a parked van on a residential street as the worked example.

5 min
A row of heavily corroded bolts on a steel plate, with the nearest bolt head in sharp focus and rust across the joint.

System Architectural Design: Where Independence Breaks

Two processors, separate software, one monitor, and a torque error neither of them can see. What an architecture is really for, why block diagrams hide shared failures, and how a small ground offset makes two independent readings agree on the wrong answer. New article, with a fictional active anti-roll bar as the worked example.

6 min
A white coupe on a workshop lift with its hood and boot lid open, the front fenders, bumper and wheels removed, exposing the radiator, suspension and body structure.

Most ISO 26262 Projects Are Modifications. Treat Them That Way.

A 150-line software change reopened the hazard analysis. A 4,000-line rewrite on the same drive unit barely touched the safety case. When an existing item is modified, ISO 26262 asks which safety activities have to be repeated. The answer comes from what each piece of old evidence assumed, not from how big the change looks or how close the evidence sits to the changed code. New article, with a one-pedal driving mode added to an electric drive unit as the worked example.

7 min
Close-up of an electric motor stator on a workshop bench, its copper windings bound with red and yellow insulation.

FTTI Is a Budget, Not a Number

An accelerator pedal sensor fault, a 150 ms fault tolerant time interval, and only about 2 ms of it spent running safety software. Detection, reaction and the transition to the safe state all draw on one interval, and most of it goes on filters, sampling, bus frames, torque ramps and mechanics. Treated as a single number, it drifts without anyone noticing. New article, with an electric car's pedal sensor fault as the worked example.

6 min
Close-up of a car's drilled brake disc and caliper on the hub, with sensor wiring running behind it.

Freedom from Interference: When QM Code Shares an ECU with ASIL D

A QM tyre pressure function and ASIL D slip control on one brake controller, and a memory protection test that passes at every speed. Freedom from interference is three questions, not one. Memory, timing and communication interference each need a different kind of evidence, and a clean result for one says nothing about the other two. New article, with a brake controller hosting indirect tyre pressure monitoring as the worked example.

6 min
An engineer seen from above holds two technical drawings over a workbench with more drawings, screwdrivers, pliers and a laptop.

Review, Audit, Assessment: Who Checks the Safety Work?

ISO 26262 asks for three kinds of confirmation, and treating them as three sizes of one check misses what each is for. One judges a work product, one judges the process, and one judges the item. A single change to a battery management system shows what each one catches and why none of them replaces the others. New article on the ISO 26262 confirmation measures.

6 min
Driver's view along an empty motorway lane passing under several stacked concrete flyovers, with two cars far ahead under the bridges.

ISO/PAS 8800 Explained: Safety for Machine Learning in Vehicles

A radar classifier that scores 99.6% on its test set and still calls a stopped car under a bridge part of the bridge. ISO/PAS 8800 treats the dataset as an engineered work product, with requirements traced to the AI safety requirements, its own safety analysis, and verification of the tools that made the labels. That is the gap ISO 26262 and ISO 21448 leave open. New article, with an automatically labelled radar dataset as the worked example.

6 min
An electronics workbench with an oscilloscope showing several waveforms, a multimeter, a circuit board under test with probe wires, and a board layout on a monitor.

Fault Injection: Proving Diagnostic Coverage Instead of Claiming It

300 injected faults, 300 detected, and the voltage supervisor still covers only about 80 % of the failure rate it was credited with. The 99 % in an FMEDA row usually comes from a handbook table. Fault injection tests the mechanism as built, and the result only means something when each failure mode is weighted by its share of the failure rate. New article, with a core supply supervisor and its deglitch filter as the worked example.

6 min
Close-up of a silicon wafer with a grid of iridescent chip dies, shallow depth of field.

When a Bit Flips: Soft Errors and Automotive Safety

A particle from space can change a value inside a working chip and leave nothing behind for a test to find. Soft errors are random hardware faults with no defect behind them. Testing cannot remove them, so ISO 26262 expects the design to handle them and the hardware metrics to count them. New article, with a crash threshold in an airbag control unit as the example.

6 min
A mountain road winding down a grassy slope into a forested valley under heavy clouds, Nockalmstrasse, Austria.

STPA in ISO 26262: Finding Hazards When Nothing Fails

A full battery, a cold morning and a long hill: the car does not slow down when the driver lifts off, and no part has failed. FMEA and FTA are usually driven by what can break. STPA starts from control actions and the context they are given in, so it prompts hazards where every component works as specified. New article, with one-pedal driving on a full, cold battery as the worked example.

6 min
Engine bay of a modern car seen from the front, with wiring harnesses, connectors and control units routed around the engine.

The Black Channel: Moving Network Safety to the Sender and Receiver

A CAN frame can pass every checksum on the bus and still carry the wrong request. One way to argue the integrity of a safety-related message rests it on the sender and the receiver, not on the network between them. This is the black channel idea, and the most common reason end-to-end protection exists. New article, with an electric parking brake release request replayed by a gateway as the example.

6 min
A car raised on a red axle stand in a workshop, its front suspension strut removed and lying on the floor, with the steering tie rod ends hanging free while a mechanic works underneath.

The Forgotten Half of ISO 26262: Production and Service

A wheel alignment that touches no sensor and still leaves the stability control with the wrong idea of straight ahead. ISO 26262 Part 7 is where design intent survives the factory floor and the workshop, or gets lost there. The carrier is the safety-related special characteristic, and the service instruction decides whether a garage restores it or quietly undoes it. New article, with a steering angle sensor zero point as the worked example.

7 min

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