Automotive cybersecurity ·An overview for functional safety engineers
ISO/SAE 21434 and ISO 26262: how they relate.
ISO/SAE 21434 is the cybersecurity standard for road vehicles. ISO 26262 handles malfunctions, ISO/SAE 21434 handles attacks, and both apply to the same item because an attack can violate a safety goal. The Academy teaches functional safety, with two Expert-plan guides and a learning path on the cybersecurity side.
- Protects against
- Functional safety: Malfunctions from systematic faults and random hardware faults
- Cybersecurity: Harm from malicious intent from outside the system
- Risk analysis
- Functional safety: HARA
- Cybersecurity: TARA
- Top-level requirement
- Functional safety: Safety goal with an ASIL
- Cybersecurity: Cybersecurity goal, optional CAL
- Edition
- Functional safety: ISO 26262:2018
- Cybersecurity: ISO/SAE 21434:2021
ISO/SAE 21434 in one screen
What it covers, and what it leaves out.
Published in 2021 by ISO and SAE International, it sets requirements for managing cybersecurity risk over the life of road vehicle E/E systems, their components and interfaces (Clause 1).
Covers
- Cybersecurity management for the organisation and for each project (Clauses 5 and 6)
- Cybersecurity activities split between customer and supplier (Clause 7)
- Continual monitoring, event evaluation and vulnerability management (Clause 8)
- The concept phase: item definition, cybersecurity goals and the cybersecurity concept (Clause 9)
- Development, validation, production, operation and maintenance, end of support (Clauses 10 to 14)
- The threat analysis and risk assessment methods used throughout (Clause 15)
Leaves out
- Specific technologies or security solutions: it prescribes none (Clause 1)
- Malfunctions from faults, which are the subject of ISO 26262
- Hazards from insufficient performance without a fault, which are the subject of ISO 21448 (SOTIF)
- Type approval: that is regulation, UN R155 and R156 below
- E/E systems whose development began before the standard was published (Clause 1)
Two lifecycles, one item
Where safety and security exchange information.
Each row pairs a functional safety activity with its cybersecurity counterpart, and the middle column is what passes between them. References in the middle point to the clause that asks for or describes the exchange.
- ManagementSafety managementISO 26262-2, Clauses 5 and 6
Each standard requires communication channels to the other discipline. Plans and milestones are aligned so dependencies show early.
26262-2, 5.4.2.3 and E.3.1 · 21434 [RQ-05-05]ManagementCybersecurity managementISO/SAE 21434, Clauses 5 and 6 - ItemItem definitionISO 26262-3, Clause 5
One description of the item, its functions and its interfaces. The boundary may differ between the two disciplines.
21434, 9.3 NOTE 4ItemItem definitionISO/SAE 21434, 9.3 - RiskHARA and ASILISO 26262-3, Clause 6
Threats are checked as possible causes of hazards, and known hazards help find threats. The safety impact of a damage scenario is rated from the ISO 26262 severity classes.
26262-2, E.3.2 · 21434 [RQ-15-06]RiskTARA and risk valueISO/SAE 21434, Clause 15 - GoalsSafety goalsISO 26262-3, 6.4.4
Goals of both kinds are compared, and a cybersecurity requirement that competes with a safety requirement is resolved before design.
26262-2, 5.4.2.3 · 21434 [RQ-05-05]GoalsCybersecurity goals, optional CALISO/SAE 21434, 9.4 - ConceptFunctional safety conceptISO 26262-3, Clause 7
How the system reacts to a detected attack is checked against the safety goals and the safety concept.
26262-2, E.3.2ConceptCybersecurity conceptISO/SAE 21434, 9.5 - DevelopmentTechnical safety concept, HW and SWISO 26262-4, Clause 6; Parts 5 and 6
Countermeasures are checked for effects on the technical safety concept, the design and independence; safety constraints go back to security. Analyses can be run together.
26262-2, E.3.3 · 26262-4, 6.4.1.3DevelopmentProduct developmentISO/SAE 21434, Clause 10 - FieldField monitoringISO 26262-7, 7.4.1.1
Field monitoring is coordinated, and a cybersecurity incident with a safety effect is reported to functional safety. A fix from incident response is checked for safety impact.
26262-2, E.3.1 and E.3.4FieldMonitoring and incident responseISO/SAE 21434, Clause 8 and 13.3 - ChangeChange managementISO 26262-8, Clause 8
A security update changes a safety-related item, so it goes through impact analysis like any other change.
26262-8, Clause 8 · 21434, 13.4ChangeUpdatesISO/SAE 21434, 13.4
Inside ISO 26262
What the 2018 edition says about cybersecurity.
References to cybersecurity are one of the changes the 2018 edition lists against 2011. There are four places worth knowing.
- ISO 26262-2:2018, 5.4.2.3. The one requirement. The organisation keeps working communication channels between functional safety, cybersecurity and other related disciplines. The examples name the two cases that matter most: a cybersecurity issue that could violate a safety goal or safety requirement, and a cybersecurity requirement that competes with a safety requirement.
- ISO 26262-2:2018, Annex E. Informative guidance, phase by phase, on where the two disciplines can exchange information: management, concept, product development, production and operation. It is written from the functional safety side only and leaves the methods to the organisation.
- ISO 26262-4:2018, 6.4.1.3. Requirements that are not safety requirements still have to be specified or referenced, and the example lists the cybersecurity concept as one source of them; 6.4.1.4 then forbids technical safety requirements and other requirements from contradicting each other.
- ISO 26262-6:2018, 5.2. A note points out that cybersecurity can be considered when developing the embedded software, with a reference back to 5.4.2.3 in Part 2.
Two scales, two questions
A CAL is not an ASIL.
Both standards end their risk analysis with a level, which tempts people to map one onto the other. They answer different questions, and neither standard maps them.
| ASIL (ISO 26262) | Risk value and CAL (ISO/SAE 21434) | |
|---|---|---|
| Rated object | A hazardous event: a malfunction in an operational situation | A threat scenario: an attack on an asset that leads to a damage scenario |
| Inputs | Severity, exposure and controllability (ISO 26262-3, 6.4.3) | Impact rated severe, major, moderate or negligible for safety, financial, operational and privacy harm (15.5), and attack feasibility rated high, medium, low or very low (15.7) |
| Result | QM or ASIL A to D, carried by the safety goal | A risk value from 1 to 5 per threat scenario (15.8); optionally a CAL from 1 to 4 for a cybersecurity goal (Annex E) |
| Status | Normative: the ASIL selects methods and, in Part 5, hardware metric targets | The risk value is normative; the CAL scheme is informative, an example the organisation may adopt |
| What it drives | The rigour of every safety activity on the requirement chain below the goal | The risk treatment decision; the CAL scales the depth of cybersecurity activities and testing |
| Changes over time | Fixed by the HARA unless the item or its use changes | The risk value moves as threats and attacks evolve; a CAL is set early and meant to stay fixed (Annex E.2) |
The one hard link between the two scales: ISO/SAE 21434 has the safety impact of a damage scenario derived from the ISO 26262 severity classification ([RQ-15-06]), so the safety evaluation can be reused there.
Regulation
Where UN R155 and R156 fit.
UN Regulation No. 155 (cyber security and cyber security management system) and No. 156 (software update and software update management system) are UNECE vehicle regulations that entered into force in January 2021. R155 makes type approval depend on the manufacturer holding a certificate of compliance for its cyber security management system and showing, per vehicle type, that cyber risks are managed; R156 does the same for software updates. According to UNECE, in the EU R155 has applied to new vehicle types of the categories in its scope since July 2022, and to all new vehicles of those categories since July 2024 (checked on 19 November 2026). Neither regulation makes ISO/SAE 21434 mandatory, but UNECE’s interpretation document for R155 treats the standard as a basis for evidencing the required processes. The homologation and regulations guide has a chapter on both.
Learn it in the Academy
Start with these.
This page is an orientation, not cybersecurity training. The guides below teach the interface in depth, with worked examples on a connected ECU.
- The full guideSafety & Cybersecurity Co-EngineeringHow ISO 26262 functional safety and ISO/SAE 21434 cybersecurity engineering work together on connected vehicles: aligning HARA with TARA, sharing work products, resolving safety-versus-security conflicts, and satisfying UNECE R155 and R156 type approval.
- The ISO/SAE 21434 guideAutomotive Cybersecurity with ISO/SAE 21434Learn how ISO/SAE 21434 runs cybersecurity engineering across a vehicle program: the organizational CSMS, item definition and assets, TARA from damage scenarios to risk treatment, cybersecurity goals and CAL, secure development, security testing, and what UNECE R155 and R156 demand after release.
- The learning pathSafety and cybersecurity co-engineering pathA week-by-week schedule for engineers who work on both sides: the co-engineering guide, platform isolation, in-vehicle networks, third-party code and the safety argument, with quizzes along the way.
For a free overview of the standard itself, read our article ISO/SAE 21434: Automotive Cybersecurity Explained.
Related guides
Functional safety guides that touch the interface.
Regulation and type approval, networks, remote diagnostics and updates, SOTIF, and the concept-phase analyses the TARA works alongside.
- Verification and assessmentHomologation, Regulations & LiabilityA functionally safe vehicle is not automatically a street-legal one, and an approved vehicle is not automatically liability-proof. Learn how type approval, the key UN Regulations and product liability law interlock with ISO 26262 for E/E and automated driving systems.
- System levelIn-Vehicle Network SafetyWhat CAN, CAN FD, CAN XL, LIN, FlexRay and automotive Ethernet actually guarantee, the communication failure catalog of ISO 26262-6 Annex D, receiver-driven signal contracts, the black-channel argument, AUTOSAR E2E protection, containment, gateways and the comm matrix as a safety artifact.
- System levelDiagnostics & Remote Service SafetyThe diagnostic connector is a command path, not a data port: UDS, DoIP and DTC mechanics, the shift to service-oriented diagnostics on vehicle computers, which read, write, routine and mode actions can violate a safety goal, and the vehicle-side gating, bounding, containment and evidence mechanisms that keep the path safe.
- Beyond the standardSotIF for the Functional Safety EngineerA FuSi-engineer manual for extending HARA, FSC, TSC, FMEDA, and the safety case into ISO 21448 (SotIF), ISO/PAS 8800, and ISO/IEC TR 5469. Deeply technical with worked examples on triggering conditions, acceptance criteria, and field monitoring.
- Concept phaseHazard Analysis & Risk Assessment (HARA)Learn how to identify vehicle-level hazards and assign ASIL ratings through Severity, Exposure, and Controllability assessment. Covers operational situations, FTTI concepts, and advanced topics for ADAS and distributed systems.
- Concept phaseItem Definition & Concept-Phase InitiationGet the first ISO 26262-3 step right: define the item boundary, interfaces, operating modes, and assumptions of use that HARA, safety goals, and the whole safety case inherit from the concept phase.
Cybersecurity FAQ
Straight answers for safety engineers.
What each standard covers and how they meet. Last reviewed 19 November 2026.
Does ISO 26262 cover cybersecurity?
Only at the interface. ISO 26262-2:2018, 5.4.2.3 requires communication channels between functional safety and cybersecurity, for example when a cybersecurity issue could violate a safety goal. Annex E of the same part is informative guidance on where the two disciplines exchange information in each phase. The cybersecurity engineering itself is the subject of ISO/SAE 21434.
Is a CAL the same as an ASIL?
No. An ASIL comes from severity, exposure and controllability of a hazardous event and sets the rigour of the safety work. A cybersecurity assurance level is an optional, informative scheme in ISO/SAE 21434 Annex E: it can be set for a cybersecurity goal, for example from the impact and the attack vector, and scales the rigour of the cybersecurity activities. There is no mapping from one to the other.
Can one analysis serve as both HARA and TARA?
No. The HARA rates hazardous events caused by malfunctions; the TARA rates threat scenarios against assets, with impact in four categories and the feasibility of each attack path. They share the item and its hazards, and ISO/SAE 21434 has the safety impact of a damage scenario rated from the ISO 26262 severity classes, so the safety evaluation can be reused there.
Is ISO/SAE 21434 mandatory?
The standard is not law. UN Regulation No. 155 requires a certified cyber security management system for vehicle type approval in the countries that apply it, and UNECE's interpretation document for R155 treats ISO/SAE 21434 as a basis for evidencing the required processes.
Does the Academy teach automotive cybersecurity?
The Academy teaches functional safety. On the cybersecurity side it has two concept guides in the Expert plan, one on ISO/SAE 21434 and one on safety and cybersecurity co-engineering, and a learning path for engineers who work across both. This page is an orientation, not cybersecurity training.
Start with the safety side
Know the safety side the TARA connects to.
A free account opens the complete Functional Safety Concept guide, five random practice exams a month, three work-product templates, one guided process and the Markov and RBD simulators. The cybersecurity guides are in the Expert plan. No credit card.
Last reviewed 19 November 2026.