Safety Design Decisions Across Vehicle Domains
Powertrain, braking, steering, ADAS, battery, cockpit, airbag, power net and thermal systems all walk the same ISO 26262 Part 3 to 6 chain, yet each arrives at a different technical answer. Learn the forces that turn one method into nine architectures.
- Chapters
- 11
- Chapters
- Vehicle domains
- 9
- Vehicle domains
- Figures
- 21
- Figures
Quick answers
- What are domain safety design decisions in ISO 26262?
- They are the concrete architectural answers, such as safe states, monitoring concepts, redundancy patterns and timing budgets, that a vehicle domain reaches when it walks the ISO 26262 Part 3 to Part 6 chain: item definition, HARA, functional and technical safety concepts, the hardware-software interface, and hardware and software design. Powertrain, braking, steering, ADAS, battery, cockpit, airbag, power net and thermal systems all use the same method, yet land on different architectures because their hazard physics, fault-tolerant time intervals, ASIL profiles and availability needs differ.
- Why do ASIL D systems have different architectures in different domains?
- Because the hazard dictates the answer. A drive that produces unintended torque can usually be made safe by removing torque, which favors layered monitoring with independent shut-off paths. An emergency braking function whose dominant hazard is unwanted braking can be made safe by not acting, which favors confirming a target with more than one sensing modality. A steering system cannot simply switch off at speed, so it needs fail-operational or ramp-down behavior. The guide works each domain through the same chain and then compares them in a cross-domain synthesis.
Why it pays for itself
Defend design choices in review
See why three-level monitoring belongs in powertrain, doer and checker in ADAS, and dual-winding motors in steering, so you can justify an architecture from hazard physics instead of copying a neighboring domain.
Nine domains, one method
Walk the same Part 3 to 6 chain (item definition, HARA, FSC, TSC, HSI, hardware, software) through nine vehicle domains and learn the forces that make the answers diverge.
Safe states from physics
Connect torque-off, honest-blank, ramp-down and degrade-and-continue to how fast each hazard develops, and see how the fault-tolerant time interval then constrains the architecture.
What you’ll be able to do
Trace a domain down the chain
Walk a system from item definition through HARA, FSC, TSC, HSI, hardware and software without skipping a link.
Derive safe states from hazard physics
Justify a safe state from how the hazard develops instead of picking one by habit.
Explain architecture choices
Say why monitoring, redundancy and doer and checker patterns appear in one domain and not another.
Protect safety islands
Argue a small ASIL function inside a QM system with freedom from interference.
Approach a new domain
Use recurring patterns and a short question set to reason about an unfamiliar system.
Chapter by chapter
- 01
The Design-Decision Chain
Learn what each work product from item definition to software design actually decides, and the forces that make domains differ.
- One method, many answers
- What each work product decides
- Forces that place a domain
- 02
Powertrain
Follow electric drive torque control from item definition to software, including its monitoring concept and shut-off paths.
- Electric drive torque control
- Three-level monitoring
- Two shut-off paths
- 03
Braking
Walk an integrated one-box brake system through the chain and see why its functional concept is a degradation ladder.
- Integrated brake system
- A ladder, not a switch
- HSI contract entries
- 04
Steering
Trace a rack-mounted EPS through the chain, from its ramp-down doctrine to a dual-winding, fail-silent architecture.
- Rack-mounted EPS
- Ramp-down doctrine
- Dual winding
- 05
ADAS
Work through AEB and highway assist, where false positives, false negatives and mode confusion shape the safety goals.
- False positives and negatives
- Two-modality confirmation
- Doer and checker
- 06
Battery Management
Follow a traction battery system whose safety goals run in seconds and whose protection uses two independent layers.
- 400 V traction battery
- Seconds, not milliseconds
- Smart primary, dumb secondary
- 07
Infotainment
See how a cockpit domain controller handles hazards of wrong belief by protecting small safety islands in a QM system.
- Hazards of wrong belief
- Honest-blank doctrine
- Safety islands
- 08
Airbag & Restraints
Walk a supplemental restraint system through the chain, from its ASIL asymmetry to two independent firing decisions.
- ASIL asymmetry
- A domain without FTTI
- Decisions in series
- 09
Power Distribution
Trace a zonal 12 V power net that executes hazards belonging to other items, with availability goals on a millisecond clock.
- Zonal 12 V distribution
- Availability goals
- Shedding ladder
- 10
Thermal Management
Follow an EV thermal system with a short HARA and a small integrity island inside otherwise QM control.
- EV thermal system
- Three small goals
- Island of integrity
- 11
Cross-Domain Synthesis
Compare the nine domains side by side, catalogue the recurring patterns and apply a short question set to any new domain.
- Nine domains at a glance
- Recurring patterns
- Questions for a new domain
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Part 3 to 6 work-product chain
The chain every domain walks through, from item definition to software design.
Two forces that place a domain
Off-safe position against fault-tolerant time, with cost pressure acting on both.
Dual-winding EPS architecture
One mechanical rack served by two electrical half-systems.
Cockpit SoC partitioning
Hypervisor-partitioned guests with a safety island for rendering.
Partitioned power net
A DC/DC converter, a separation switch, e-fuse branches and safety loads fed from two sides.
Who this guide is for
- Engineers moving between domains, from powertrain to ADAS or braking to battery
- System architects who must explain why their TSC differs from the sister project
- Safety newcomers who know the method but have not seen it produce real architectures
- Reviewers judging whether a proposed safe state actually fits the hazard
Frequently Asked Questions
Common questions about Safety Design Decisions Across Vehicle Domains
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Where this topic leads next.
- System levelTechnical Safety ConceptLearn how to translate safety goals and FSC into technical safety requirements (TSRs), system architecture, and HW/SW allocation. Covers safety mechanisms, diagnostic coverage, FMEA integration, and a complete worked example with templates.
- Concept phaseItem Definition & Concept-Phase InitiationGet the first ISO 26262-3 step right: define the item boundary, interfaces, operating modes, and assumptions of use that HARA, safety goals, and the whole safety case inherit from the concept phase.
- Concept phaseHazard Analysis & Risk Assessment (HARA)Learn how to identify vehicle-level hazards and assign ASIL ratings through Severity, Exposure, and Controllability assessment. Covers operational situations, FTTI concepts, and advanced topics for ADAS and distributed systems.